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INTRODUCTION 
 “[D]iscrimination today rarely operates in isolated states of mind; 
rather, it is often influenced, enabled, even encouraged by structures, 
practices, and opportunities of the organizations within which groups and 
individuals work.”1 It is easy to identify discrimination when an employer 
has a hiring policy that does not allow women with small children to be 
hired as employees but does allow men with small children to be hired and 
women without children to be hired.2 It is more difficult to identify 
discrimination when a woman’s job changes subtly, or her performance 
reviews become more negative, after she becomes a mother.3 The latter is 
not overt, it is influenced by social constructs, outdated stereotypes, and 
presumptions about what it means to be a mother. Moreover, at its core, 
such discrimination presumes that being a mother has a negative 
connotation in terms of participation in the workplace. This phenomenon 
has encouraged many to embrace a slower employment trajectory for 
working mothers, the “mommy track”;4 however, at the same time tacit 
acceptance of a mommy track has washed over onto scores of working 
women who don’t want motherhood to hinder career progress.5 In a sense, 
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 1. Thomas H. Barnard & Adrienne L. Rapp, Pregnant Employees, Working Mothers and the 
Workplace—Legislation, Social Change and Where We Are Today, 22 J.L. & HEALTH 197, 237 (2009) 
(alteration in original) (quoting Tristin K. Green, Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics: Toward a 
Structural Account of Disparate Treatment Theory, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 91, 128 (2003)). 
 2. See Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971) (Marshall, J., concurring) (per 
curiam) (holding that under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, an employer may not refuse to hire 
women with small children while hiring men with small children). 
 3. See, e.g., Fuller v. GTE Corp., 926 F. Supp. 653 (M.D. Tenn. 1996) (dismissing plaintiff’s 
claim of employment discrimination due to a hostile work environment towards recent mothers because 
plaintiff failed to show fathers were not similarly treated); Bass v. Chem. Banking Corp., No. 94 Civ. 
8833, 1996 WL 374151 (S.D.N.Y. July 2, 1996) (dismissing plaintiff’s claim of employment 
discrimination because plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of failure-to-promote where 
promotion was given to another female, albeit without children). 
 4. Virginia Postrel, ‘Mommy Track’ Without Shame, WALL ST. J., Mar. 26, 2011, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704461304576216651515154140.html. 
 5. Id.; Kimberly Palmer, The New Mommy Track: More Mothers Win Flextime at Work, and 
Hubbies’ Help (Really!) at Home, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Sept. 3, 2007, http://www.usnews.com/ 
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presumptions about working mothers are built upon similar stereotypes 
about women’s inadequacies in the workplace generally.6 
 Supreme Court jurisprudence suggests that it is appropriate to review 
Title VII discrimination claims under a construct of “sex plus” where an 
individual alleges discrimination based upon a protected characteristic, sex, 
plus a fundamental right or immutable characteristic.7 Sex-plus theory 
posits that “[i]t is impermissible to treat men characterized by some 
additional characteristic more or less favorably than women with the same 
added characteristic.”8 In that vein, the Supreme Court and other federal 
courts have recognized that sex “plus” being a parent of small children may 
support a claim of sex discrimination, but those same courts have refused to 
recognize sex “plus” breastfeeding as a basis for sex discrimination because 
men do not breastfeed.9 This differential treatment in the eyes of the law 
occurs solely because the “fundamental right” or “immutable characteristic” 
must be shared by members of both sexes even where the characteristic or 
right being challenged might be exclusively female.10 
 It is not just the definition of sex plus that drives this type of 
dichotomy. It also depends in large part on how the issue is framed. Thus, 
when the Supreme Court in General Electric v. Gilbert chose to frame a 
question of disability insurance for pregnancy as a question of excluding a 
medical condition versus recognizing that pregnancy was uniquely female, 
it was able to side-step sex discrimination jurisprudence.11 When the 
                                                                                                                                             
usnews/biztech/articles/070826/3mommy_print.htm; Lisa Belkin, Fired From the ‘Mommy Track,’ N.Y. 
TIMES MOTHERLODE: ADVENTURES IN PARENTING BLOG (Mar. 26, 2010, 4:00 PM), 
http://parenting.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/03/26/fired-from-the-mommy-track/. 
 6. But, conversely, all women are considered mothers, even if it is only their potential for 
motherhood that is being judged. “Women may not be identified as mothers, for not all women are or 
want to be mothers. But women-as-a-caste behave as they do because most are mothers.” Rebecca 
Korzec, Working on the “Mommy-Track”: Motherhood and Women Lawyers, 8 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L. 
J. 117, 121 (1997) (quoting MARILYN FRENCH, THE WAR AGAINST WOMEN 199 (1992)). Sara Ruddick 
notes that while men and non-mothers may also be mothers in the sense that they engage in maternal 
work, “the practices and cultural representations of mothering” are conceptually linked to women. SARA 
RUDDICK, MATERNAL THINKING: TOWARD A POLITICS OF PEACE 40–41 (1989). 
 7. Phillips, 400 U.S. at 544. 
 8. Martinez v. N.B.C., Inc., 49 F. Supp. 2d 305, 310 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (citing Fisher v. Vassar 
Coll., 66 F.3d 379 (2d Cir. 1995), as amended 70 F.3d 1420, 1428 (2d Cir. 1995)). 
 9. Phillips, 400 U.S. at 544; Martinez, 49 F. Supp. 2d at 310. 
 10. Martinez, 49 F. Supp. 2d at 310–11; see Coleman v. B-G Maint. Mgmt. of Colo., Inc., 108 
F.3d 1199, 1203 (10th Cir. 1997) (holding that a female employee failed to show differential treatment 
from similarly situated members of the opposite sex, as required for a sex-plus claim). 
 11. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 135 (1976). Even though Gilbert was ultimately 
overruled when Congress enacted the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, the ghost of Gilbert remains as 
some courts still use this kind of logic when applying sex plus—focusing on the patent policy rather 
than latent impacts on protected groups of women such as breastfeeding mothers. See Derungs v. Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc., 374 F.3d 428, 435 (6th Cir. 2004) (noting that the plaintiffs incorrectly assumed that 
the comparability analysis used by the Supreme Court in Gilbert was completely obliterated in all 
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Gilbert Court did not apply the sex-plus legal framework to the claim 
presented, the approach was at odds with the earlier Supreme Court 
decision in Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., where a subclass of women, 
those who were mothers with small children, could maintain a sex-plus 
claim because they were treated differently than men with small children 
and, in practice, were treated differently than women without small 
children.12 The Court in Gilbert should have focused on the policy’s effect 
on women as a group, both those that were pregnant as well as those who 
could become pregnant, but it chose not to do so. The legacy of Phillips is 
that if there is no comparator class among those of the opposite sex, then a 
woman cannot maintain a claim under the sex-plus analysis.13 Gilbert did 
not apply Phillips because the Court chose not to approach the issue as one 
of discrimination against any particular group; instead, the Court deemed 
the exclusion of pregnancy from disability benefits as an issue of insurance 
coverage,14 in essence avoiding the question of discrimination altogether. 
This became more evident when the Court next considered insurance 
coverage for spouses of male employees.15 The Court’s choice to focus on 
coverage worked because there was no overt declaration of discrimination 
against women, and the coverage decision was theoretically based on cost.16 
Because only fools would articulate a policy to discriminate overtly, what 
decisions like Phillips and Gilbert have done is to drive the discrimination 
underground where it now thrives covertly.17 But, the reality is that even if 
the Court had applied sex plus to the claim in Gilbert, the claim would have 
failed because there was no comparator class of pregnant men.  
 Over time, as gender discrimination has become less overt, the power 
of sex plus as a tool to demonstrate discrimination has become less potent. 
                                                                                                                                             
factual contexts even though the holding had been overruled); Wallace v. Pyro Mining Co., 789 F. Supp. 
867, 869 (W.D. Ky. 1990) (“While breast-feeding, like pregnancy, is a uniquely female attribute, 
excluding breast-feeding from those circumstances for which Pyro will grant personal leave is not 
impermissible gender-based discrimination, under the principles set forth in Gilbert.” (citing Nashville 
Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136 (1977)). The court in Wallace found that Title VII and the Pregnancy 
Discrimination Act were not applicable to plaintiff’s situation. Id. 
 12. Phillips, 400 U.S. at 544. 
 13. See Martinez, 49 F. Supp. 2d at 310–11 (deciding that plaintiff had failed to establish a 
prima facie case of gender-plus discrimination because there was no comparator class of men). 
 14. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 135. 
 15. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669 (1983). 
 16. Id. at 682. 
 17. But apparently some “fools” remain, as some employers continue to perpetuate stereotypes 
about mothers’ roles overtly, and to the extent that they do, it appears that Title VII adequately addresses 
their actions. See, e.g., Sheehan v. Donlen Corp., 173 F.3d 1039, 1042–43 (7th Cir. 1999) (noting that an 
employee’s supervisor made statements such as “Oh, my God, she’s pregnant again,” “you’re not 
coming back after this baby,” and when she was fired, “[h]opefully this will give you some time to 
spend at home with your children”). Many of these cases deal with an individual’s preconceived notions 
and not institutional prejudices that may be more subtle. 
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But, when trying to address subtle forms of discrimination against women, 
what if the courts recognized same-sex comparators as an appropriate group 
when the “plus” characteristic is related to motherhood or to other 
characteristics that are uniquely female, or even do away with comparators 
altogether and focus solely on “mother” as equivalent to female? Such a 
question sits atop a “persistent ‘fault line between work and family—
precisely where sex-based overgeneralization has been and remains 
strongest.’”18 The question is twofold—is stereotyping about mothers a 
form of gender discrimination, and can such discrimination “be determined 
in the absence of evidence about how the employer in question treated 
fathers[?]”19 
 Shifting to a same-sex comparator has become necessary to address the 
concept of gender discrimination and motherhood because it is rare these 
days for women to experience the type of blatant discrimination at issue in 
Phillips.20 After forty-plus years of Title VII, thirty years of the Pregnancy 
Discrimination Act, and nearly twenty years with the Family Medical Leave 
Act, the kind of discrimination that remains is based upon the social 
construct of the workplace and it is far more insidious. It results in women 
being “mommy tracked” or subject to the “maternal wall” because of our 
social perceptions of the appropriate roles of mothers as primary caregivers 
and the corresponding norms that have emerged in the workplace.21 This, of 
course, is in addition to the “glass ceiling” that many women contend with 
in the workplace already.22 “[N]otions that mothers are insufficiently 
devoted to work, and that work and motherhood are incompatible, are 
properly considered to be, themselves, gender-based.”23 Thus, stereotypical 
remarks about mothers and employer action based on social misconceptions 
                                                                                                                                             
 18. Back v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 365 F.3d 107, 113 (2d Cir. 2004) 
(quoting Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 738 (2003)). 
 19. Id.  
 20. Although such discrimination is not as uncommon as one might hope. See Bailey v. Scott-
Gallaher, 480 S.E.2d 502, 503 (Va. 1997) (discussing an employer’s assertion after a mother’s return 
from maternity leave that a mother’s place was in the home with her child).  
 21. MARY C. STILL, CTR. FOR WORK LIFE LAW, UNIV. OF CAL. HASTINGS COLL. OF LAW, 
LITIGATING THE MATERNAL WALL: U.S. LAWSUITS CHARGING DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WORKERS 
WITH FAMILY RESPONSIBILITIES 4 (2006). The term “maternal wall” first appeared in the 1990s. Id. at 4. 
It was used in part to explain the problem of pay disparity between men and women. Id. It reflects that 
there remains a “motherhood penalty” in terms of salary that did not disappear as more and more women 
entered the workforce. Id. It has become used more broadly in recent years to encompass issues related 
to motherhood, including caregiving and continuing stereotypes about the roles of women as employees 
versus mothers. Id.  
 22. See Joan C. Williams & Nancy Segal, Beyond the Maternal Wall: Relief for Family 
Caregivers Who Are Discriminated Against on the Job, 26 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 77, 98–101 (2003) 
(discussing the interaction of the glass ceiling with the maternal wall and the compounding of the 
problem that results from gender stereotyping on two levels). 
 23. Back, 365 F.3d at 121. 
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about mothers and their role within the family should be considered 
evidence of gender discrimination, not just evidence of parental 
discrimination requiring a comparator class of fathers to prove.24 
 Instead of allowing this to continue, why not take a small step toward 
removing this barrier to maintaining a claim under Title VII and allow a 
woman to state a claim when she can demonstrate that, as a mother, she has 
been treated less favorably than others, regardless of the gender of the 
comparator class?25 When one begins with the understanding that women as 
a group still suffer discrimination and inequality in the workplace, it makes 
little sense to compare women with men in looking at distinctly female 
issues. Until the courts start drilling down into these subsets of working 
women who are subject to discrimination, we will not achieve true parity in 
the workplace.26  
 In practice, a reconceived sex-plus test, where comparators become 
meaningful for the discrimination being targeted or where comparators are 
perhaps no longer necessary, may be the exception, but it may be as 
valuable as the legal concept of piercing the corporate veil when a 
corporation is trying to end-run rules by hiding behind a corporate fiction.27 
It favors equity and honoring the spirit as well as the letter of Title VII.28 
                                                                                                                                             
 24. There is an increasing attention to stereotyping in demonstrating discrimination against 
both male and female caregivers. Termed family-responsibilities discrimination, it utilizes various legal 
theories to address discrimination against employees who are also caregivers. As a parent and caregiver, 
the man or woman is treated differently than the opposite sex based upon stereotyping. This is not the 
focus of this Article but is clearly related to the conversation herein. Lawsuits involving family-
responsibilities discrimination encompass claims of gender stereotyping, sex-plus discrimination, 
pregnancy discrimination, hostile work environment, retaliation, disparate treatment, disparate impact, 
interference with Family Medical Leave Act rights, ERISA, and the ADA. STILL, supra note 21, at 6. 
Unlike this broader approach, this Article focuses solely on Title VII claims using a sex-plus theory of 
discrimination and argues that a woman’s status as a mother can be considered gender discrimination as 
long as she can show that she is being treated differently than other women. Inherent in such a claim is 
the recognition that stereotyping is at play but that it is not as obvious as direct discrimination. Thus, this 
Article seeks to address a more discrete component of family responsibilities discrimination. 
 25. As a practical matter, this would also allow mothers to maintain claims under Title VII 
based on discrimination against them as breastfeeding mothers. 
 26. While the broader themes of equality, feminism, corrective legislation, and social discourse 
serve as an important context and background for this conversation, the competing theories, opinions, 
and suggestions are beyond the scope of the Article. Instead, the Author hopes to invite a discussion 
about smaller incremental changes that can be made within the existing legal framework to recognize 
our differences in a way that continues to promote formal equality. 
 27. Piercing the corporate veil is a judicially created doctrine that seeks to do equity by 
removing limited-liability protection from those who abuse the protection the law offers. See generally 
CARTER G. BISHOP & DANIEL S. KLEINBERGER, LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES: TAX AND BUSINESS 
LAW ¶ 6.03 (2011) (citing Kaycee Land & Livestock v. Flahive, 46 P.3d 323, 326–27 (Wy. 2002); RCO 
Int’l Corp. v. Clevenger, 904 N.E.2d 941 (Ohio App. 2008)). “[E]quity will not [permit] a corporate veil 
to cover fraud or injustice . . . .” Sullivan v. Sullivan, 54 So. 3d 520, 523 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (first 
alteration in original) (quoting Plank v. Arban, 241 So. 2d 198, 200 (Fl. Dist. Ct. App. 1970)). Courts 
apply this doctrine to reach beyond what may be a carefully crafted legal façade to address injustice or 
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 However, in order to do this, it is not enough to reconsider the 
requirements of Phillips and Gilbert and advance them one step further. 
Instead, the courts must recognize that being a mother is distinct from being 
a parent.29 Like breastfeeding, it is something that is wholly female and has 
intrinsic value.30 Part II of this Article will address gender-specific traits, 
specifically the concept of mother, and the fact that equality under Title VII 
encompasses protection of such a concept from gender discrimination. Part 
III will discuss the evolution of the sex-plus doctrine from the inception of 
Title VII to today. Part IV will suggest a new way of constructing the sex-
plus doctrine to root out and prevent more subtle discrimination against 
mothers in the workplace. 
I. STATING THE OBVIOUS: WOMEN ARE DIFFERENT AND MOTHERS ARE 
DIFFERENT, BUT WOMEN ARE MOTHERS 
 In 1943, transportation managers were offered advice on how to deal 
with women in the workplace during World War II.31 The advice mirrored 
some of the misconceptions of the time: 
 
 Give . . . female employee[s] a definite day-long schedule 
of duties so that they’ll keep busy without bothering the 
management for instructions every few minutes. Numerous 
properties say that women make excellent workers when they 
have their jobs cut out for them, but that they lack initiative in 
finding work themselves. 
                                                                                                                                             
fraud that might otherwise go unremedied. In a similar way, asking courts to look beyond the legal 
constructs of “male” and “female” in gender discrimination suits can address injustices that might 
otherwise go unpunished, and it would further the purpose of Title VII. 
 28. It may also offer support for family-caregiver suits so that they can move beyond claims 
based solely on gender stereotyping. 
 29. Part of this recognition is based on mother as primary caregiver. While this same argument 
could be extended to men who are primary caregivers, such a discussion is beyond the scope of this 
article. See, e.g., Debra Cassens Weiss, Suit by Fired Associate Claims Dechert’s Macho Culture 
Punished Paternity Leave, A.B.A. J., Dec. 16, 2010, http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/suit_by_ 
fired_associate_claims_decherts_macho_culture_punished_paternity_le_/ (discussing a male attorney’s 
primary-caregiver discrimination claim against his employer). Instead, within the confines of Title VII, 
this Article seeks ways to address subtle discrimination against a class of persons—women—who also 
happen to be mothers. Many of those affected by this type of discrimination have not sought 
accommodation in the workplace but instead have been “mommy tracked” simply because they are 
mothers. 
 30. While there is no obvious biological component, such as pregnancy or breastfeeding, I 
would argue it is in the same vein. The mother-child connection has to do with caregiving and a 
biological need to be attached. 
 31. 1943 Guide to Hiring Women, SAAVY & SAGE, Sept./Oct. 2007, at 16 (featuring an excerpt 
from the July 1943 issue of Transportation Magazine written for male supervisors of women in the 
workforce during World War II). 
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 . . . . 
 Be tactful when issuing instructions or in making 
criticisms. Women are often sensitive; they can’t shrug off harsh 
words the way men do. Never ridicule a woman - it breaks her 
spirit and cuts off her efficiency.32 
 
These types of misconceptions continued, even beyond enactment of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964. Prior to 1970, several airlines had “motherhood” 
restrictions in place that required female flight attendants with children, 
even those that had adopted children, to be grounded or resign.33 In 
defending their policies, airlines justified them because “mothers of young 
children would have unacceptably high rates of absenteeism, . . . mothers 
might be subject to overriding domestic concerns that would make them 
questionable risks for competent performance in times of crisis, 
and . . . mothers returning from maternity leaves of absence would require 
expensive retraining.”34 In justifying their discriminatory treatment, the 
airlines acknowledged that “mothers” were different. However, there was 
no corresponding policy against fathers of young children. If mothers were 
fathers, there would be no concern about job performance or domestic 
responsibilities. Indeed, the policy perpetuated the stereotype that only 
mothers could satisfy the needs of their young children and such an 
obligation would necessarily interfere with a mother’s work outside the 
home. 
 While we would like to think that we have come a long way, even from 
the early 1970s, the truth is that many of these stereotypical generalizations 
remain. In the late 1990s, Joann Trezza alleged that her supervisors made 
disparaging remarks about the “incompetence and laziness of women who 
are also working mothers” and that “working mothers cannot be both good 
mothers and good workers, stating, ‘I don’t see how you can do either job 
well.’”35 Thus, even at the turn of the twenty-first century, employers 
continued to cling to the idea that working mothers in the workplace were 
simply different and less valuable. The idea that they are still different is 
                                                                                                                                             
 32. Id. 
 33. In re Consol. Pretrial Proceedings in Airline Cases, 582 F.2d 1142, 1144 (7th Cir. 1978). 
TWA maintained a policy of removing female flight attendants during pregnancy and after a child was 
born. Id. Any mothers were terminated permanently if they refused to accept ground-duty positions, but 
the policy did not apply to male flight attendants. Id. 
 34. Id. at 1145. These reasons were provided in support of establishing a bona fide 
occupational qualification. Id. 
 35. Trezza v. Hartford, Inc., No. 98 Civ. 2205, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20206, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. 
Dec. 30, 1998). 
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not based just on gender but on the social concept of what the role of a 
mother is and how it differs from other caregiving obligations.36 
 There are two different kinds of stereotyping that occur with respect to 
a woman’s role as a mother. Prescriptive stereotyping involves statements 
about how a woman should behave, i.e., a mother should be at home with 
her children, while descriptive stereotyping involves how women tend to 
behave or appear.37 Both have an impact on how mothers are perceived in 
the workplace and both have legal significance.38 Gender stereotyping for 
mothers tends to occur at one of three points in time: when a woman 
becomes pregnant, when she becomes a mother, or when she asks for a 
reduced or more flexible work schedule.39 At that point, there can be a shift 
in perception from viewing an accomplished employee as a “high-
competence business woman” to viewing her as a “low-competence 
caregiver.”40 The inherent problem with this prejudicial thinking is that  
                                                                                                                                             
 36. In fact, much of the commentary surrounding working mothers these days is that they 
cannot “have it all.” Barnard & Rapp, supra note 1, at 229–30. But many would suggest that it is not that 
working mothers cannot have it all, it is that they are redefining what it means to work and be a mother 
in the new millennium. See BECKY BEAUPRE GILLESPIE & HOLLEE SCHWARTZ TEMPLE, GOOD ENOUGH 
IS THE NEW PERFECT: FINDING HAPPINESS AND SUCCESS IN MODERN MOTHERHOOD, at ix (2011). 
Regardless of how this debate is framed, it still does not excuse outmoded stereotypes or discrimination 
against mothers in the workplace. Instead, moving away from stereotypes to individual performance and 
situations is necessary to finally remove this type of discrimination from the workplace. 
 37. Williams & Segal, supra note 22, at 94–96 (citing Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of 
Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 
STAN. L. REV. 1161 (1995); Diana Burgess & Eugene Borgida, Who Women Are, Who Women Should 
Be: Descriptive and Prescriptive Gender Stereotyping in Sex Discrimination, 5 PSYCH. PUB. POL’Y & 
L. 665 (1999)); see also Kerri Lynn Stone, Clarifying Stereotyping, 59 U. KAN. L. REV. 591, 616, 620 
(2011) (positing that, with respect to employment decisions, the “tendency to regard someone through 
the lens of their [sic] protected class status [e.g., women or Latinos] and not as an individual for whom 
individual facts and attributes can be discerned based upon experience often belies one’s vulnerability to 
prejudicial thinking”). 
 38. Gender stereotyping in the workplace occurs when an employer “assumes that the worker 
will behave a certain way because of his or her gender, or makes negative assumptions if the worker 
does something consistent with a gender role despite his or her individual performance.” CTR. FOR 
WORK LIFE LAW, UNIV. OF CAL. HASTINGS COLL. OF LAW, ISSUE BRIEF: CURRENT LAW PROHIBITS 
DISCRIMINATION BASED ON FAMILY RESPONSIBILITIES & GENDER STEREOTYPING 2 (2006) [hereinafter 
ISSUE BRIEF]. For example, such discrimination assumes that a mother who arrives to work late or 
leaves early is doing so because she has childcare issues or expresses the belief that mothers belong at 
home with their children. Id. 
 39. Alison A. Reuter, Subtle But Pervasive: Discrimination Against Mothers and Pregnant 
Women in the Workplace, 33 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 1369, 1410 (2006) (citing Debbie N. Kaminer, The 
Work-Family Conflict: Developing a Model of Parental Accommodation in the Workplace, 54 AM. U. L. 
REV. 305, 314 (2004)). 
 40. Id. (quoting Kaminer, supra note 39, at 314). In one instance, one lawyer who returned 
from maternity leave felt the need to exclaim “I had a baby, not a lobotomy” when she returned to work 
and was given work normally assigned to paralegals. Barnard & Rapp, supra note 1, at 235. Another 
author has noted that viewing child-rearing as “mother’s work” has “exact[ed] significant career costs” 
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[w]hile . . . government cannot outlaw stereotypical beliefs, 
cognizance of those beliefs and recognizing how deep-rooted or 
far-reaching they may be is the only way in which to accurately 
ferret out certain instances of disparate treatment on the basis of 
protected class status. And that is the end game in employment 
discrimination jurisprudence.41 
 
 The reality is that women comprise nearly half of the work force in the 
United States.42 Of those women, nearly 60% are mothers.43 Even though 
they comprise nearly half of the workforce and a majority of women will 
become mothers during their careers, women are still marginalized in the 
workplace as a gender.44 Women still earn salaries that are about 80% of 
what men earn in comparable jobs.45 Fewer women hold managerial 
positions and are in higher-level positions.46 Women are still subject to the 
“glass ceiling,” the “mommy track,” and the “maternal wall,” which are all 
tied to a woman’s gender and gender roles rather than her ability. As a 
group, they still struggle with gender stereotyping, wrestling with the 
supposition that they “will conform to a gender stereotype” as well “as to 
the supposition that [they are] unqualified for a position because [they do] 
not conform to a gender stereotype.”47 
                                                                                                                                             
for female lawyers. See Korzec, supra note 6, at 117 (noting that access to the legal profession has not 
translated into gender equality within the profession). 
 41. Stone, supra note 37, at 621 (emphasis omitted). 
 42. EEOC, UNLAWFUL DISPARATE TREATMENT OF WORKERS WITH CAREGIVING 
RESPONSIBILITIES 1 (2007) [hereinafter EEOC GUIDANCE], available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/ 
docs/caregiving.pdf. Eighty-two percent of all women become mothers and statistics indicate that 
married women spend nearly twice as much time per day on childcare than married men. ISSUE BRIEF, 
supra note 38, at 3; see also BECKY PETTIT & JENNIFER L. HOOK, GENDERED TRADEOFFS: FAMILY, 
SOCIAL POLICY, AND ECONOMIC INEQUALITY IN TWENTY-ONE COUNTRIES 21 (2009). 
 43. EEOC GUIDANCE, supra note 42, at n.4. 
 44. See PETTIT & HOOK, supra note 42, at 21. Pettit and Hook noted that “women still have not 
reached parity with men on most economic indicators in most countries.” Id. Specifically, research 
indicates that “women are less likely to be employed than men,” that they are “underrepresented in the 
most highly paid occupations,” and that they still earn less than men. Id. 
 45. Women’s-to-Men’s Earnings Ratio by Age, 2009, U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS  
(July 8, 2010), http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/print.pl/opub/ted/2010/ted_20100708.htm; see also PETTIT & 
HOOK, supra note 42, at 21 (stating that women “still earn between 50 and 90 percent of men’s wages”). 
 46. PETTIT & HOOK, supra note 42, at 21. 
 47. Back v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 365 F.3d 107, 119 (2d Cir. 2004) 
(citing Weinstock v. Columbia Univ., 224 F.3d 33, 44–45, 57 (2d Cir. 2000)) (applying the principles 
first stated in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989)). Price Waterhouse involved a female 
plaintiff who was refused a partnership for being perceived as too assertive and abrasive. One partner 
even suggested “charm school.” The case stands for the proposition that gender stereotypes about 
feminine versus masculine characteristics and their desirability in the workplace can constitute gender 
discrimination. 490 U.S. at 235, 250; see Back, 365 F.3d at 119 (quoting Weinstock, 224 F.3d at 57–58 
(Cardamone, J., dissenting)) (concluding that Price Waterhouse applies whether the stereotype is that 
the plaintiff is too feminine or too masculine because in both cases employers demand that the plaintiff 
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 When these limitations are applied to a clearly protected status 
applicable to all women—gender—then legal redress is available to a 
woman.48 However, if a woman is a mother as well, she becomes a member 
of a sub-class of women who may be subject to distinct and additional 
discrimination based on a characteristic that is uniquely female but not 
legally recognized as “immutable” or “fundamental.” If a woman cannot 
present a clear case of stereotyping to satisfy a case of direct discrimination, 
she may never be able to demonstrate that she is suffering discrimination 
based on her status as a mother. 
 The fact that there is a “mommy track” demonstrates that mothers are 
different and are treated differently.49 There is no comparable “daddy 
track.”50 In fact, as Korzec noted, “the joint status of husband and father 
increases a man’s desirability as a worker as he is regarded as more stable 
and mature than his childless, bachelor counterpart. Conversely, the mere 
status of motherhood diminishes the value of women employees in the eyes 
of employers.”51 
 The “mommy track” arose as a concept over twenty years ago.52 The 
idea was that women could choose a slower career track in order to 
                                                                                                                                             
perform one of these but perceive the roles as fundamentally incompatible). The other problem mothers 
face is the stereotype of the “ideal” worker. The ideal worker has no caregiving responsibilities, is able 
to work a minimum of forty hours a week year-round, and can work overtime with little or no notice. 
Reuter, supra note 39, at 1411 (citing Kaminer, supra note 39, at 314). It is modeled on a male 
employee and reflects an outdated version of the nuclear family. Id. 
 48. Claims of gender discrimination are clearly cognizable under Title VII. EEOC GUIDANCE, 
supra note 42, at 2. 
 49. It also recognizes that despite advances and shifting expectations, “women continue to be 
most families’ primary caregivers.” Id. However, some feminists cast the term “mothering” as 
“concrete, sometimes monotonous and mundane work performed in caring for children.” Korzec, supra 
note 6, at 123 (citing Susan Rae Peterson, Against Parenting, in MOTHERING: ESSAYS IN FEMINIST 
THEORY 62–64 (Joyce Trebilcot ed., 1983)). However, “fathering” connotes something less than child-
nurturing. Id. Either way, these roles are often identified as distinct. Id. (citing ADRIENNE RICH, OF 
WOMAN BORN: MOTHERHOOD AS EXPERIENCE AND INSTITUTION 12–13 (1976)).  
 50. Although, perhaps there should be. As we continue to evolve and move away from the 
more traditional roles fitted on men and women, more men are opting to scale back as well and 
contribute to family caregiving more than in the past. EEOC GUIDANCE, supra note 42, at 4 (citing 
Donna St. George, Fathers Are No Longer Glued to Their Recliners, WASH. POST, Mar. 20, 2007, at 
A11; Karen L. Brewster & Bryan Giblin, Explaining Trends in Couples’ Use of Fathers as Childcare 
Providers, 1985–2002, at 2–3 (2005) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Vermont Law Review)). 
 51. Korzec, supra note 6, at 126 (citing Martin H. Malin, Fathers and Parental Leave, 72 TEX. 
L. REV. 1047, 1047–48 (1994); Nancy E. Dowd, Family Values and Valuing Families: A Blueprint for 
Family Leave, 30 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 335, 364 (1993)). 
 52. Postrel, supra note 4. The term was coined after Felice Schwartz published an article in the 
Harvard Business Review in 1989 entitled “Management Women and the New Facts of Life.” Id.; see 
Felice N. Schwartz, Executives and Organizations: Management Women and the New Facts of Life,  
HARV. BUS. REV., Jan./Feb. 1989, at 65, 70 (proposing an altered career track for women who desired to 
both work and support a family).  
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accommodate family obligations and balance both worlds.53 Even at that 
time, Schwartz recognized that not all professional women were alike.54 
Schwartz argued that there was value in building flexibility into the 
workplace to retain talented and creative women who would otherwise exit 
the workforce or accept less career growth.55 Schwartz’s article was 
prescient, and the “mommy track,” for better or worse, has remained a 
constant in women’s career development. Even if a woman avoids the 
“mommy track” or tries to exit it at some point, she may still end up 
running right into the “maternal wall.”56 A woman hits the maternal wall 
when she suffers discrimination as a result of her role as a mother, rather 
than her sex.57 
II. TITLE VII AND THE EVOLUTION OF SEX-PLUS THEORY IN GENDER 
DISCRIMINATION 
A. Title VII 
 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 created “simple but 
momentous”58 protection from discrimination in the workplace based on 
gender.59 “The simplicity of the original statutory scheme indicated a 
Congressional assessment of discrimination in 1964 as an important issue 
and an unacceptable practice, but also as a simple and obvious occurrence 
that could be easily remedied.”60 The intent was to “prevent employers from 
refusing ‘to hire an individual based on stereotyped characterizations of the 
sexes.’”61 Even the most restrictive reading of the legislative history 
                                                                                                                                             
 53. See Schwartz, supra note 52, at 69. 
 54. Postrel, supra note 4. 
 55. Id. 
 56. See STILL, supra note 21, at 4. 
 57. Id. at 5. 
 58. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 239 (1989) (“In passing Title VII, Congress 
made the simple but momentous announcement that sex . . . [was] not relevant to the selection, 
evaluation, or compensation of employees.”). 
 59. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006). Under Title VII, it is an unlawful employment practice to 
discriminate against a person in the workplace based upon race, color, religion, gender, or national origin 
with respect to compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment. The act provides that:  
 It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer— 
 (1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to 
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin . . . . 
Id. § 2000e-2(a). 
 60. Kathryn Branch, Note, Are Women Worth As Much As Men?: Employment Inequities, 
Gender Roles, and Public Policy, 1 DUKE J. GENDER L & POL’Y 119, 146 (1994). 
 61. See Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 545 (1971) (Marshall, J., concurring) 
(quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1(a)(1)(ii) (1971)). Justice Marshall observed that “[e]ven characteristics of 
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indicates a congressional desire to eradicate employment decisions that 
were based on gender instead of job qualifications.62 While job-related 
criteria or qualifications serve as a permissible basis for discrimination, they 
are not permissible to the extent that they permit discrimination on the basis 
of gender.63  
 Early problems arose when it became apparent that some job-related 
criteria or qualifications related to employment were, by their very nature, 
discriminatory with respect to gender.64 Thus, in response to one such 
instance, Congress enacted the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA) to 
specifically extend Title VII’s protection to women with respect to 
pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.65 “Legislative history 
accompanying passage of the PDA provided that ‘[t]he entire 
thrust . . . behind [that] legislation [was] to guarantee women the basic right 
to participate fully and equally in the workforce, without denying them the 
fundamental right to full participation in family life.’”66 Clearly, pregnancy 
could be a separate criterion, but there was an underlying recognition that 
such a criterion was gender-specific. The problem is that since 1978, 
Congress has failed to take additional steps to recognize similar criteria as 
gender-specific, and the courts have only extended Title VII minimally to 
address some more subtle versions of gender-specific discrimination 
cloaked in seemingly gender-neutral qualifications. The one small step 
forward was the enactment of a new subsection in section 703 of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1991.67 To establish liability under the Act, a claimant must 
                                                                                                                                             
the proper domestic roles of the sexes were not to serve as predicates for restricting employment 
opportunity.” Id. at 545. 
 62. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 243–44.  
 63. Id. at 244. 
 64. Even before these problems arose, proponents of protection for women were stymied by 
reports that the addition of “sex” to the law was a fluke and that the EEOC’s apparent lack of interest in 
enforcing that part of the Act was based on the lack of legislative history. See generally Rachel 
Osterman, Origins of a Myth: Why Courts, Scholars, and the Public Think Title VII’s Ban on Sex 
Discrimination was an Accident, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 409, 416–24 (2009).  
 65. Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (current version 
at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2006)). The pertinent language provides that the “terms ‘because of sex’ or ‘on 
the basis of sex’ include, but are not limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or 
related medical conditions; and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions 
shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k). The Pregnancy 
Discrimination Act was enacted with the express purpose of overturning the United States Supreme 
Court ruling in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976). See Newport News Shipbuilding & 
Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 670 (1983) (noting that Congress decided to overrule the 
decision in Gilbert by amending Title VII to prohibit sex discrimination on the basis of pregnancy).  
 66. Barnard & Rapp, supra note 1, at 238 (alterations in original) (quoting 123 CONG. REC. 
29,658 (1977)).  
 67. The new subsection provided that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this subchapter, an 
unlawful employment practice is established when the complaining party demonstrates that race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other 
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only show that discrimination was a contributing factor in an employment 
decision and the employer no longer gets an out if it can demonstrate that it 
would have made the same decision based on non-discriminatory reasons 
where the same employment decision was made, in part, for a 
discriminatory reason.68 To a large extent, however, “the law’s response to 
the tension between women’s work and family responsibilities has been 
minimal and slow.”69 
B. The Evolution of Sex-Plus Discrimination Theory 
1. Flight Attendants Pave the Way 
 In the late 1960s, shortly after passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
several charges were filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC) alleging that airlines were discriminating against 
female flight attendants on the basis of sex.70 At the heart of the dispute was 
whether certain airline policies, such as terminating or reassigning a female 
flight attendant upon marriage or pregnancy, or when she attained a certain 
age, were bona fide occupational qualifications (BFOQ) or simple gender 
discrimination.71 The airlines asserted that employing married stewardesses 
“would lead to operational and administrative problems, would tend to 
produce a deterioration in service, and would cause marital difficulties for 
the stewardesses.”72 While the airlines pointed to scheduling concerns and 
                                                                                                                                             
factors also motivated the practice.” Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 107(a), Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 
1071 (1991) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m)). This change in civil rights was made in direct 
response to Price Waterhouse. Toni Scott Reed, Flight Attendant Furies: Is Title VII Really the Solution 
to Hiring Policy Problems?, 58 J. AIR L. & COM. 267, 337 (1992) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 102-40(II), at 2 
(1991)).  
 68. Reed, supra note 67, at 338. The Supreme Court later held that such a claim did not require 
the presentation of direct evidence; rather, a mixed-motive claim could create a jury question when 
sufficient circumstantial evidence existed for a jury to conclude by a preponderance of the evidence that 
a protected status was a motivating factor in an employment practice. Desert Palace, Inc., v. Costa, 539 
U.S. 90, 101 (2003). 
 69. Laura T. Kessler, The Attachment Gap: Employment Discrimination Law, Women’s 
Cultural Caregiving, and the Limits of Economic and Liberal Theory, 34 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 371, 
391 (2001). 
 70. Neal v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 1973 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 4010 (June 20, 1968). At the 
time, the position was also referred to as stewardess or hostess. 
 71. Id. at 4012. A bona fide occupational qualification is a defense an employer may raise 
when a policy or qualification is otherwise discriminatory. Thus, if there is a valid BFOQ, such 
discrimination is permissible because it is “reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that 
particular business or enterprise.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e). Analysis of a BFOQ requires that the 
standard be related to the essence of the job, a factual basis for believing a person in the excluded class 
would be unable to perform the job, and an inability to deal with members of the excluded class on an 
individual basis. Reed, supra note 67, at 340. 
 72. Neal, 1973 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) at 4013. 
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balancing demands of work and home, there was also a specific concern 
that since “our society places the responsibility for homemaking and 
childrearing on women, married women’s absences from home would be 
more likely to put a strain on family harmony than similar absences by 
married men for business reasons; . . . [S]tewardesses’ absences on flights 
would, therefore, cause marital disharmony.”73  
 In Neal v. American Airlines, the EEOC found that the practice of 
terminating an airline stewardess after she married was unlawful sex 
discrimination under Title VII.74 American Airlines had terminated 
stewardesses based on marriage since 1935.75 The EEOC held that  
 
[t]he concept of discrimination based on sex does not require an 
actual disparity of treatment among male and female employees 
presently in the same job classification. It is sufficient that a 
company policy or rule is applied to a class of employees 
because of their sex, rather than because of the requirements of 
the job.76  
 
Interestingly, the EEOC specifically stated that the discriminatory policy 
could not be remedied by simply applying the rule to male flight attendants. 
The Commission observed that “[d]iscrimination based on sex unrelated to 
job performance is not to be eliminated by applying the same irrelevant 
conditions to members of the opposite sex.”77  
 In Colvin v. Piedmont Aviation, the airline instituted a no-marriage 
policy in 1962 when it began hiring female flight attendants.78 The airline 
had previously employed only male flight attendants, and it did not have a 
no-marriage policy for those attendants, nor did the new no-marriage policy 
apply to the male flight attendants who remained after 1962.79 As in Neal, 
                                                                                                                                             
 73. Id. at 4013 n.11. Interestingly, the evolution of women as stewardess entered a new phase 
after World War II. Reed, supra note 67, at 270–71. At that time, airlines moved toward the “sex object” 
criteria for hiring flight attendants. Id. at 271. In addition to height, weight, and age standards, strict 
standards of appearance were imposed. Id. The “flying ‘playboy experience’ and the ‘Hefner-esque’ 
atmosphere” became the model for the industry according to some critics. Id. (citing THOMAS M. 
ASHWOOD, THIS IS YOUR CAPTAIN SPEAKING: A HANDBOOK FOR AIR TRAVELERS 103 (1974); Franklin 
Nachman, Hiring, Firing, and Retiring: Recent Developments in Airline Labor and Employment Law, 
53 J. AIR L. & COM. 31, 51–56 (1987)). 
 74. Neal, 1973 Emp’t Prac. Dec. (CCH) at 4015; see also Colvin v. Piedmont Aviation, Inc., 
1973 Empl. Prac.Dec. (CCH) 4016 (June 20, 1968). 
 75. Neal, 1973 Emp’t Prac. Dec. (CCH) at 4011. 
 76. Id. at 4014. 
 77. Id. at 4015. 
 78. Colvin, 1973 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) at 4016. 
 79. Id.  
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the Commission found that such a policy was related to sex and that 
reasonable cause existed to believe Piedmont’s policy violated Title VII.80 
 The decisions in Neal and Colvin conflicted with an earlier ruling in 
Cooper v. Delta Airlines.81 Eulalie Cooper filed suit after she was 
terminated from her job as a flight attendant because she married.82 The 
district court found that Delta, which only hired females as stewardesses, 
could in its discretion hire only stewardesses who were “single and young, 
20 to 26 years of age, average height, 5’2” to 5’6”, slim, not more than 135 
pounds, educated, at least two years of college” along with “good 
complexions,” “neat,” “attractive,” and of good moral character.83 Delta’s 
basis for these requirements was that single women made better 
stewardesses than married women because passengers accepted them more 
readily, flight scheduling was easier, and there was less likelihood of 
pregnancy.84 The district court held that Congress did not include marital 
status in Title VII.85 Thus, Delta could discriminate based on marital status 
without offending Title VII.86 
 The interesting thing about the flight attendant cases of the late 1960s, 
other than revealing some amazing stereotypes and gender-defining roles, is 
that these cases dealt with discrimination against women where often the 
only other class comparator was other women. That is not to say that these 
cases contemplated the fact that a sub-class of women were being treated 
differently than other women; indeed, these cases ignored that concept 
altogether and simply found that Title VII did not cover “plus” 
requirements.87 Only the EEOC acknowledged that a proper reading of Title 
VII required an adjudicatory body to look beyond the “plus” and determine 
how it related to the protected class in question.88 These cases set the stage 
for what came next, a shift to sex plus as a viable theory under Title VII. 
                                                                                                                                             
 80. Id. at 4018. 
 81. Cooper v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 274 F. Supp. 781 (E.D. La. 1967). 
 82. Id. at 781. 
 83. Id. at 782. 
 84. Id.; see Comment, Marital Restrictions on Stewardesses: Is This Any Way to Run an 
Airline?, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 616, 618–19 (1969) (criticizing the logic used by the court in allowing 
these reasons to stand). 
 85. Cooper, 274 F. Supp. at 783. By extension, the district court indicated that every other 
requirement recited by Delta would not violate Title VII as well. Id. 
 86. Id. The district court did not find that Delta’s requirements would have been BFOQs, only 
that the law did not protect on the basis of marriage. Id. 
 87. Interestingly, at least one later case took on the sex-plus theory and applied it to flight 
attendants. In Stroud v. Delta Airlines, Inc., the court found that because Delta only hired female flight 
attendants, a woman who was fired after she married could not maintain a claim because there were no 
married male flight attendants to serve as a comparator class. Instead, the court would be comparing 
married and unmarried women, a distinction not protected under Title VII. 544 F.2d 892, 892 (5th Cir. 1977). 
 88. Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 411 F.2d 1, 2 (5th Cir. 1969), vacated per curiam, 
Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971). 
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2. The Supreme Court Adopts a Sex-Plus Theory of Discrimination 
 When Ida Phillips sued Martin Marietta Corporation for refusing to 
hire her because she had pre-school age children, the question presented to 
the Supreme Court was more than simply whether such a decision was 
discriminatory, it was a question of how the protections afforded to women 
under Title VII would unfold for the next several decades and how far that 
protection could extend. 
 Ida Phillips sought employment at Martin Marietta as an assembly 
trainee.89 At the time of her application, Martin Marietta had a policy 
against hiring women with pre-school age children.90 The company would 
hire women without pre-school age children and men with pre-school age 
children.91 When she was refused employment, Phillips filed suit claiming 
gender discrimination in violation of Title VII.92 
 The Fifth Circuit found that Phillips was not subject to illegal 
discrimination because she was not refused employment based on her 
gender.93 Instead, it was the “coalescence of . . . two elements”—she was a 
woman and she had pre-school age children.94 In the court’s opinion, this 
did not rise to the level of illegal discrimination because adding another 
criterion removed the per se violation of Title VII.95 
 In his dissent from the denial of a petition for rehearing, Chief Judge 
Brown reframed the matter more clearly: 
 
The case is simple. A woman with pre-school children may not 
be employed, a man with pre-school children may. The 
distinguishing factor seems to be motherhood versus fatherhood. 
The question then arises: Is this sex-related? To the simple query 
the answer is just as simple: Nobody—and this includes Judges, 
Solomonic or life tenured—has yet seen a male mother. A 
mother, to oversimplify the simplest biology, must then be a 
woman. It is the fact of the person being a mother—i.e., a 
woman—not the age of the children, which denies employment 
opportunity to a woman which is open to a man.96 
 
                                                                                                                                             
 89. Phillips, 411 F.2d at 2. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 4. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. at 3–4; Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 416 F.2d 1257, 1260 (5th Cir. 1969) (Brown, 
C.J., dissenting). 
 96. Phillips, 416 F.2d at 1259. Brown noted that the man would qualify even if he were a 
single parent. Id. at n.5. 
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In a per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court held that the Fifth Circuit erred 
in reading Title VII to permit one hiring policy for women with pre-school 
age children and another policy for men with pre-school age children.97 The 
Court remanded for further development of the record to determine whether 
Martin Marietta could establish a BFOQ based on the existence of 
conflicting family obligations that were “demonstrably more relevant to job 
performance for a woman than for a man.”98 Justice Marshall observed that 
while an employer could require all employees who are parents to meet 
certain standards to ensure that caring for their children did not interfere 
with employment, he could not agree that a BFOQ could be established “by 
a showing that some women, even the vast majority, with pre-school-age 
children have family responsibilities that interfere with job performance and 
that men do not usually have such responsibilities.”99 Marshall was 
concerned that the BFOQ defense would swallow the rule.100 
 Phillips has been construed to stand for the proposition that gender, 
plus another characteristic, is a basis for a claim of illegal discrimination 
under Title VII.101 The mere fact that the Supreme Court remanded this case 
gave birth to this “sex plus” theory. How it has been interpreted since 
Phillips is also telling. After Phillips, sex plus could be alleged as long as a 
plaintiff could identify a comparator class of men. 
 In Gilbert, female employees filed suit against their employer claiming 
sex discrimination based on the exclusion of pregnancy-related disabilities 
from the employer’s disability plan.102 The Supreme Court held that Title 
VII’s protection did not extend to pregnant women because a non-pregnant 
woman did not suffer discrimination and there was no indication that the 
denial of disability benefits was anything other than a decision not to cover 
a specific physical condition.103 The Supreme Court reached this 
remarkable conclusion even though the EEOC had interpreted Title VII to 
protect pregnancy-related disabilities from discrimination.104 The majority 
                                                                                                                                             
 97. Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 544 (1971). 
 98. Id. Pursuant to section 703(e) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, an employer may 
demonstrate that a facially discriminatory action is permissible because the condition is a “bona fide 
occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or 
enterprise.” Id. (quoting Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703(e), Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241, 256 (1964) 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (2006)).  
 99. Id. at 544 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
 100. Id. 
 101. Fisher v. Vassar Coll., 66 F.3d 379 (2d Cir. 1995), as amended 70 F.3d 1420, 1433 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 102. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 127 (1976). 
 103. Id. at 145–46. 
 104. The EEOC guideline, promulgated in 1972, provided that:  
Disabilities caused or contributed to by pregnancy, miscarriage, abortion, 
childbirth, and recovery therefrom are, for all job-related purposes, temporary 
disabilities and should be treated as such . . . . [Benefits] shall be applied to 
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framed the issue as one where there was “no risk from which men are 
protected and women are not” creating a neutral reason for omitting 
pregnancy from disability protection.105 
 Essentially, the Supreme Court reviewed a discriminatory practice that 
disproportionately affected the claimants due to gender and looked past the 
protected status, choosing to focus solely on the other reason for 
discrimination, without considering the blatant connection to the protected 
status.106 The reality is that no pregnant man could complain because there 
simply are none. Non-pregnant women may not have had a claim at that 
moment, but clearly as a protected class they had an interest in the 
application of Title VII to this claim. 
3. Beyond Phillips and Gilbert: Modern Applications of Sex-Plus Theory 
 Currently, to plead sex plus as a theory of discrimination, a claimant 
must allege that she is being treated differently than a comparable subclass 
of the opposite sex.107 The “plus” must also be a fundamental right or an 
immutable characteristic.108 Thus, according to the courts, childcare and 
child-rearing are not sex-plus characteristics, but being a parent is an 
appropriate characteristic.109 Marital status is also recognized as an 
                                                                                                                                             
disability due to pregnancy or childbirth on the same terms and conditions as they 
are applied to other temporary disabilities. 
Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 140–41 (alteration in original) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10(b) (1975)). In coming 
to its conclusion, the Supreme Court noted that the EEOC promulgated its interpretation some eight 
years after passage of the law and that this guideline contradicted an earlier interpretation provided 
closer to the time of Title VII’s enactment. Id. at 141–42. 
 105. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 148 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 
484, 496–97 (1974)). Geduldig held that there was no gender discrimination under the Fourteenth 
Amendment for a similar disability insurance plan. Id. 
 106. Id. at 160. 
 107. Martinez v. N.B.C. Inc., 49 F. Supp. 2d 305, 310 (S.D.N.Y 1999). 
 108. Earwood v. Cont’l Se. Lines, Inc., 539 F.2d 1349, 1351 (4th Cir. 1976) (citing Griggs v. 
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429–30 (1971)); Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publ’g Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 
1091 (5th Cir. 1975).  
 109. Guglietta v. Meredith Corp., 301 F. Supp. 2d 209, 214 (D. Conn. 2004) (citing Record v. 
Mill Neck Manor Lutheran Sch., 611 F. Supp. 905, 907 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (holding that child-rearing is 
not a sex-plus characteristic protected by Title VII, the Pregnancy Disability Act, or any other federal 
statutes); Barnes v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 846 F. Supp. 442, 445 (D. Md. 1994)). But see In re Consol. 
Pretrial Proceedings in Airline Cases, 582 F.2d 1142, 1145 (7th Cir. 1978), rev’d, 455 U.S. 385 (1982) 
(using sex-plus theory to find that Transworld Airlines’ “no motherhood” policy was discriminatory on 
its face); Piscottano v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 118 F. Supp. 2d 200, 212 n.5 (D. Conn. 2000) (stating that 
gender-based assumptions about a mother’s role in childcare duties are questionable). Guglietta 
involved an adverse employment action wherein a mother claimed her employer treated women with 
children differently than men with children. 301 F. Supp. 2d at 211–12. However, the court reframed the 
claim as one of a woman with “childcare difficulties” rather than merely a question of parental status. Id. 
at 213–14. The court ultimately held that the shift change Guglietta was required to make did not rise to 
the level of an adverse employment action. Id. at 215. The question remains whether the same result 
2011] A More Sophisticated Sex-Plus Analysis 345 
 
appropriate secondary characteristic for sex-plus discrimination cases.110 
Prior to the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, pregnancy was not an 
appropriate secondary characteristic, but it now receives protected status as 
a subset of gender.111 Breastfeeding, however, is still not an appropriate 
secondary characteristic, nor is any other facet of motherhood other than a 
woman’s status as a parent or her pregnancy and related medical 
conditions.112 
 Using this theory, the Southern District of New York refused to 
consider a breastfeeding mother’s claim of sex-plus discrimination because 
there was no corresponding sub-class of breastfeeding men.113 The court 
found that Martinez failed to state a prima facie claim of gender 
discrimination because to hold otherwise would elevate breastfeeding to 
protected status under Title VII.114 
 However, around the same time, the Southern District of New York 
found that same-sex comparators could satisfy the first step of the 
McDonnell Douglas115 burden-shifting analysis.116 Trezza claimed that her 
employer failed to promote her because she was a mother, instead 
promoting less-qualified women without children or men who had 
                                                                                                                                             
would have been reached where the “childcare difficulties” were perceived versus identified and where 
the mother does not seek an accommodation as Guglietta did in her case. 
 110. See generally Fisher v. Vassar Coll., 66 F.3d 379 (2d Cir. 1995), as amended 70 F.3d 1420 
(2d Cir. 1995); Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir. 1971). However, some courts 
have even found that marital status ceases to be an appropriate comparator where there is no identifiable 
group of men that are subject to the same policy. See Stroud v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 544 F.2d 892, 893 
(5th Cir. 1977) (citing Jurinko v. Edwin L. Wiegand Co., 477 F.2d 1038, 1044 (3d Cir. 1973), vacated 
on other grounds, 414 U.S. 970 (1973)). 
 111. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 145–46; Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 
92 Stat. 2076 (1978) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2006)); see Newport News Shipbuilding 
& Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 670 n.1 (1983). 
 112. Martinez, 49 F. Supp. 2d at 310–11; Wallace v. Pyro Mining Co., 789 F. Supp. 867, 869 
(W.D. Ky. 1990), aff’d, 951 F.2d 351 (6th Cir. 1991). The court in Wallace viewed the employee’s 
claim as one based on the desire to care for her child, not a medical reason related to her pregnancy and 
childbirth. Id. The result was that a woman who gave birth and chose to breastfeed her infant was 
afforded less protection under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act than a woman who had miscarried or 
who chose to have an abortion. 
 113. Martinez, 49 F. Supp. 2d at 310–11. 
 114. Id. at 311. It seems to have escaped the district court’s notice that as a uniquely female 
characteristic, foreclosing a claim on this basis creates a license for employers to discriminate based on 
breastfeeding without any repercussions. 
 115. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). Under this analysis, a 
plaintiff must first make a prima facie showing of discrimination. Once the plaintiff does this, the 
burden shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employment 
decision. If the employer satisfies this burden, then the claimant must demonstrate by a preponderance 
of the evidence that the legitimate reasons offered by the employer are only a pretext for discrimination. Id.  
 116. Trezza v. Hartford, Inc., No. 98 Civ. 2205, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20206, at *18 (S.D.N.Y 
Dec. 30, 1998). 
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children.117 She also alleged a hostile work environment based on 
comments made by her managing attorneys such as “women are not good 
planners, especially women with kids.”118 
 The court acknowledged that ultimately Trezza would have to prove 
disparate treatment between men and women in order to prevail on a Title 
VII claim.119 However, the court noted that such a burden arrives later in the 
burden-shifting analysis.120 At the initial stage, where a court is merely 
determining whether a plaintiff has stated a prima facie case, “the 
defendant’s selection of someone of the same sex as plaintiff but without 
the added characteristic is insufficient to defeat an otherwise legitimate 
inference of discrimination—the essence of a plaintiff’s prima facie 
case.”121 The court specifically noted that “a defendant should not be able to 
escape liability for discrimination on the basis of sex merely by hiring some 
members of the protected group.”122 The court did note, however, that 
Trezza claimed she was treated differently than men with children as well 
as women without children.123 That last detail was likely what saved 
Trezza’s claim at the initial stages of the proceeding. 
 In a similar case, a mother of a child with disabilities was able to 
maintain a Title VII claim under a sex-plus theory of discrimination where 
she alleged that her job transfer was based on unfounded stereotypes about 
mothers of disabled children and that a similar employment decision would 
not have been made of a woman without a disabled child or a father with a 
disabled child.124 The court found that McGrenaghan had established a 
prima facie case because the woman who replaced her was less qualified, 
not a mother of a disabled child, and not a member of the subclass, and 
because she had “provided direct evidence of discriminatory animus against 
working mothers and mothers with disabled children by the [p]rincipal” of 
the school.125 
                                                                                                                                             
 117. Id. at *6–7. With respect to the specific positions discussed, women without children were 
given the job, and men with children were offered one position but declined it. Id. 
 118. Id. at *5 (quoting Amended Complaint at 29, Trezza, No. 98 Civ. 2205 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 30, 1998)). 
 119. Id. at *16–17. 
 120. Id. at *17. 
 121. Id. at *17–18. 
 122. Id. (citing Graham v. Bendix Corp., 585 F. Supp. 1036, 1047 (N.D. Ind. 1984) (“The duty 
not to discriminate is owed each minority employee, and discrimination against one of them is not excused 
by a showing the employer did not discriminate against all of them, or there was one he did not abuse.”)) 
 123. Trezza, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20206, at *19–20; see also King v. Trans World Airlines, 
738 F.2d 255, 258–59 (8th Cir. 1984) (holding that unlawful bias in the hiring process may be found 
where a job interview included questions about pregnancy, childbearing, and childcare, which were not 
regularly asked of either male of female applicants). 
 124. McGrenaghan v. St. Denis Sch., 979 F. Supp. 323, 327 (E.D. Pa. 1997). 
 125. Id. As in Trezza, the fact that fathers of disabled children were treated differently may have 
influenced the court’s decision to rely on the replacement’s non-membership in the subclass to satisfy 
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 While cases like Trezza and McGrenaghan indicate that same-sex 
comparators are acceptable on some level, they fail to take them beyond the 
prima facie pleading stage. The question becomes why this type of 
evidence cannot satisfy the pretext part of the analysis.126 Otherwise, the 
policy reasons for not letting employers get away with more subtle 
discrimination are not honored. In essence, an employer can always hire, 
promote, or otherwise favor a woman without children and never run afoul 
of Title VII, unless the employer favors men with children under the same 
circumstances. This is more problematic when there is no obvious policy in 
place, and the reason for the differing treatment is based on the fact that a 
woman is a mother, not just a parent. An employer escapes liability for 
discriminating against women by only discriminating against some women, 
and the underlying reason is related solely to a woman’s gender and role as 
a mother. 
 That was the case in Bass v. Chemical Banking Corp.127 where the 
plaintiff’s complaint was dismissed because she failed to produce evidence 
that demonstrated she was treated differently than married men or men with 
children.128 Bass claimed that her responsibilities, ability to get promoted, 
and working conditions began to shift after certain males were placed in her 
direct line of supervision and after she took two separate maternity 
leaves.129 Bass also alleged that her department and supervisors treated 
female employees differently than male employees in terms of personal 
interaction and social issues.130 When Bass was terminated, she was 
replaced by another woman.131 
                                                                                                                                             
McGrenaghan’s prima facie burden. It could well be that the direct evidence of discriminatory animus 
also made this an easier call for the court. 
 126. In another case, the court allowed a claim of gender discrimination to survive summary 
judgment, finding that the plaintiff had presented a genuine issue of material fact as to pretext. This was 
based on comments made by key decisionmakers at plaintiff’s company regarding her status as a mother 
and her plans to have another child. Santiago-Ramos v. Centennial P.R. Wireless Corp., 217 F.3d 46, 
56–57 (1st Cir. 2000). Plaintiff also presented evidence that the legitimate reasons were after-the-fact 
justifications. Id. at 56. In Santiago-Ramos, the court did not use the sex-plus construct but simply 
viewed the claim as one of gender discrimination based upon impermissible stereotyping. 
 127. Bass v. Chem. Banking Corp., No. 94 Civ. 8833, 1996 WL 374151, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 2, 1996). 
 128. Id. at *6; see also Bruno v. City of Crown Point, 950 F.2d 355, 365 (7th Cir. 1991) 
(Easterbrook, J., dissenting) (recognizing that a hiring employee’s paternalistic questions directed only 
to women could lead a jury to infer that this employee thought about women and men differently, which 
could lead to an inference that the hiring decision was based on gender and the applicant’s role as a wife 
and mother). 
 129. Bass, 1996 WL 374151, at *2–3. When Bass refused to sign a written warning about 
attendance during working hours, she was terminated. Id. at *3. 
 130. Id. at *2. 
 131. Id. at *3. The promotion to Vice President that Bass was waiting for was also given to a 
woman who was single and had no children. 
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 The court found that Bass could not state a prima facie case under 
McDonnell Douglas because a woman was promoted to the position central 
to Bass’s failure-to-promote claim.132 Bass claimed discrimination based on 
gender and marital or parental status, but the court would not allow her to 
maintain this claim where her replacement was an unmarried woman with 
no children.133 Given the environment at Chemical at the time of her failure-
to-promote claim, it seems even more untenable not to allow a claim to 
proceed simply because management chose to promote a woman rather than 
a man. Interestingly, the court acknowledged that the atmosphere in the 
office could lead a rational factfinder to infer that Bass’s discharge was 
motivated by gender.134 Ultimately, while Bass failed to survive summary 
judgment on her failure-to-promote claim because of a lack of a male 
comparator, her claim of discriminatory discharge survived because of the 
environment in her office and an underlying claim of pretext.135 
 In Gee-Thomas v. Cingular Wireless, Heather Gee-Thomas applied for 
two managerial positions for which she was arguably qualified.136 The 
supervisor hiring for the second position asked if she really wanted to 
travel, which she took as a question directed at her because she was the 
mother of five children.137 A married man with children was hired for the 
first position, and a single woman with no children was hired for the second 
position.138 In her complaint, Gee-Thomas specifically claimed that she was 
denied the first position because “male decisionmakers considered non-job-
related criteria for women applicants that they did not consider for male 
applicants, including family and marital status.”139 While the court 
acknowledged that Thomas could satisfy the initial prongs of McDonnell 
Douglas, the problem was that she could not demonstrate pretext where she 
was as qualified as the man chosen, but not more qualified.140 Interestingly, 
while the court allowed the claim of family and marital status to stand, it 
did not acknowledge those reasons in its discussion of pretext.141 
                                                                                                                                             
 132. Id. at *5. 
 133. Id. The court found that “[a]t most, a rational factfinder could infer from the fact that 
Chemical promoted a single woman with no children rather than Bass that Chemical discriminated 
against married persons or persons with children, discrimination not prohibited by Title VII.” Id. 
 134. Id. at *6. The court noted that Bass’s contention that one supervisor, Briand, had difficulty 
communicating with women, more readily socialized with male employees, including lunches and get-
togethers at his home, and that he permitted male employees, but not female employees, to attend certain 
conferences and seminars, would support such a claim. Id. at *1–2. 
 135. Id. at *7. 
 136. Gee-Thomas v. Cingular Wireless, 324 F. Supp. 2d 875, 878–79 (M.D. Tenn. 2004). 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. at 881. 
 140. Id. at 886–88. 
 141. Id. at 884–88 
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 In two more recent cases, the courts addressed discriminatory 
employment decisions that were allegedly based on a woman’s status as a 
mother and how that related to gender discrimination.142 Elena Back 
claimed that her supervisors denied her tenure based on their stereotyping 
of her role as a mother.143 Although she had received strong reviews and 
recommendations for tenure, she was questioned repeatedly about her 
decision to continue to work in her position and be a mother.144 When she 
was denied tenure, Back filed a § 1983 claim alleging that her constitutional 
rights had been violated in contravention of the Fourteenth Amendment.145 
 In reviewing Back’s complaint on a summary judgment motion, the 
Second Circuit noted that “notions that mothers are insufficiently devoted 
to work, and that work and motherhood are incompatible, are properly 
considered to be, themselves, gender-based” stereotypes.146 On this basis, 
the Second Circuit rejected the school’s argument that a comparator class of 
fathers was necessary for Back to survive summary judgment, because “the 
ultimate issue is the reasons for the individual plaintiff’s treatment, not the 
relative treatment of different groups within the workplace. As a result, 
discrimination against one employee cannot be cured, or disproven, solely 
by favorable, or equitable, treatment of other employees of the 
same . . . sex.”147 More importantly, the Second Circuit found that Back had 
proffered enough evidence to survive summary judgment with respect to 
the third stage of McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework, pretext, 
even where she was unable to offer a comparator class from the opposite 
                                                                                                                                             
 142. Back v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 365 F.3d 107, 113 (2d Cir. 2004); 
Philipsen v. Univ. of Mich. Bd. of Regents, No. 06-CV-11977-DT, 2007 U.S. Dist LEXIS 25898, at 
*13–14 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 22, 2007). 
 143. Back, 365 F.3d at 115. 
 144. Id. Back’s supervisors asked how many more children she planned to have and when, and 
they showed concern that if she received tenure, she would work fewer hours. They did not know how 
she could do her job with children, and Back recalled that they wondered 
whether my apparent commitment to my job was an act. They stated that once I 
obtained tenure, I would not show the same level of commitment I had shown 
because I had little ones at home. They expressed concerns about my child care 
arrangements, though these had never caused me conflict with school 
assignments.  
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 145. This type of claim requires that a plaintiff prove “purposeful or intentional discrimination 
on the basis of gender.” Id. at 118 (citing Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 
U.S. 252, 264–65 (1977)). 
 146. Id. at 121 (citing Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 733 n.5 (2003)). Hibbs 
identified the stereotype that “women’s family duties trump those of the workplace” as a gender 
stereotype. Id. 
 147. Id. at 121–22 (quoting Brown v. Henderson, 257 F.3d 246, 252 (2d Cir. 2001)) 
(“[S]tereotyping of women as caregivers can by itself and without more be evidence of an 
impermissible, sex-based motive.”). 
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sex that was treated differently.148 Thus, at least with respect to a direct 
claim of gender discrimination, the Second Circuit was willing to recognize 
that stereotyping a mother’s role was a valid claim of gender 
discrimination, and even though other women at the school had children, 
the issue focused on how Back herself was treated.149 
 However, in Philipsen v. University of Michigan Board of Regents,150 
the court refused to allow a claim to proceed when a plaintiff could not 
offer a comparator class of men with small children for the simple reason 
that no men worked in the department.151 Philipsen filed suit against her 
employer alleging sex-plus discrimination when her employer rescinded a 
job offer because she was a woman with small children.152 Philipsen had 
been working for the same department at the University part-time when the 
full-time job offer was made.153 Philipsen’s supervisors were aware she had 
small children and she asked questions about flexible scheduling and 
working part-time at first to transition her children into new childcare.154 
The employer claimed that Philipsen’s claim failed because she could not 
identify male employees with young children who were treated 
differently.155 The court observed that allowing this type of claim would 
render the gender discrimination one of parental discrimination, which was 
not appropriate.156 
 While the underlying facts of the Philipsen case may not have been as 
compelling as those in Back, if they had been, Philipsen would have been 
unable to maintain a claim. While the court chose to categorize the 
discrimination as “parental,”157 it was actually gender-based discrimination 
against women who are mothers. 
III. WORKING TOWARD A MORE SOPHISTICATED SEX-PLUS THEORY OF 
DISCRIMINATION 
 Commentators have observed that the rigidity of Title VII coupled with 
narrow judicial interpretation of sex-plus theory limits the effectiveness of 
                                                                                                                                             
 148. Id. at 124. 
 149. Id. at 122. 
 150. Philipsen v. Univ. of Mich. Bd. of Regents, No. 06-CV-11977-DT, 2007 U.S. Dist LEXIS 
25898, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 22, 2007). 
 151. Id. at *22. 
 152. Id. at *13–14. 
 153. Id. at *2, *7.  
 154. Id. at *3, *7–8. 
 155. Id. at *21. 
 156. Id. at *27. 
 157. Id. at *29. 
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addressing discrimination suffered by women who are mothers.158 If the 
discrimination cannot be tied to a biologically identifiable characteristic, 
then the bridge to discrimination cannot be crossed. Instead, a mother is 
stuck at an impasse. Clearly, there can be discrimination, and other forms of 
discrimination based on outmoded stereotypes have diminished. The 
question is why this type of gender discrimination lingers. As Chief Judge 
Brown observed over forty years ago, “[a] mother is still a woman. And if 
she is denied work outright because she is a mother, it is because she is a 
woman. Congress said that could no longer be done.”159 While Judge 
Brown was dealing with an outright denial of work, the idea should be 
extended to more subtle discrimination. If a woman suffers discrimination 
because she is a mother, then that should be sufficient to maintain a claim 
under Title VII, and the burden should shift to an employer to justify its 
conduct. It should not matter that women without children are not subject to 
similar treatment; rather, the focus should be on the fact that the woman is 
suffering because she is a mother. 
 A more sophisticated analysis of sex-plus discrimination will better 
address intraclass preferences evidenced by stereotyping. Stone explains 
that intraclass preferences allow an individual who has a prejudice against a 
protected class, such as women, to “engage[] in discrimination within the 
class, preferring those who do not conform to the stereotype of the class to 
which he adheres.”160 In other words, the decisionmaker evaluates 
candidates based on qualities that are set apart from their class.161 
 Intraclass-preference stereotyping is problematic because the 
discrimination and preference exist within the protected class, limiting a 
plaintiff’s ability to make a prima facie case and limiting the appearance of 
discrimination if the selected candidate is a member of the same protected 
class.162 These barriers to employment discrimination are equally as 
applicable when a preference is given to women without children or a 
woman with children is treated differently. The problem is, without the 
ability to apply same-sex comparators in a sex-plus claim, or to make a 
stereotyping claim without a comparator class, a mother is less likely to 
                                                                                                                                             
 158. Kessler, supra note 69, at 400. Kessler observed that women’s biological differences have 
“become the outer limit to which employers can typically be held liable” because the requirement of the 
presence of an immutable characteristic or fundamental rights “has rendered the success of sex-plus 
caregiving claims highly unlikely.” Id. At the root of this observation is the fact that caregiving and the 
status as a mother are not entirely biological but arguably have a biological component. 
 159. Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 416 F.2d 1257, 1262 (5th Cir. 1969) (Brown, C.J., 
dissenting). 
 160. Stone, supra note 37, at 622. 
 161. Id. Stone offers the example of hiring an African-American who a decisionmaker perceives 
not to be “too” African-American. 
 162. Id. at 622–23. 
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survive a summary judgment motion or be able to prove pretext if she does 
survive summary judgment. Apparently, even the EEOC agrees that, at least 
with respect to comments that reflect stereotypical views of women with 
children, an inference of discrimination may be made in the absence of 
comparative evidence about more favorable treatment of men with 
children.163 While this helps mothers who can demonstrate direct evidence 
of discriminatory animus, it would not help a woman who could only 
demonstrate that women with children were treated differently than women 
without children. 
 Given the breadth of this problem, there may be a question as to why 
such a modest step is even useful. While this may be a valid point, 
sometimes the “conventional wisdom of starting out with cases of modest 
sweep, and building consensus that certain social practices, never before 
seriously questioned, do in fact constitute illegal discrimination” can have 
value.164 New legislation or a more expansive reading of Title VII or the 
PDA would be just as helpful in moving toward a workplace that avoids 
discrimination against mothers and recognizes each mother as an 
individual. However, until such legislation is passed, adopting the idea that 
same-sex comparators can serve to demonstrate disparate treatment, or, 
even better, that comparators are unnecessary to demonstrate a sex-plus 
claim because maternal discrimination is the same as gender discrimination, 
would at least take another layer away from the core of the problem and 
give women, and men, a more powerful legal tool. 
 Frankly, courts have allowed Title VII claims to involve parties in the 
same protected class under other circumstances, so why not apply those 
principles here to honor the spirit of Title VII? Clearly, women can 
discriminate against other women on the basis of gender or pregnancy,165 
women can sexually harass other women,166 and men can discriminate 
                                                                                                                                             
 163. EEOC GUIDANCE, supra note 61, at 21 n.43. 
 164. Williams & Segal, supra note 23, at 111. In that article, the author offered sexual 
harassment as an example of such a case. The idea is to use mothers who are otherwise “ideal 
workers”—who have not sought any real caregiving accommodations—to demonstrate that even they 
have suffered disparate treatment because of their status as mothers. This can cause a ripple effect that 
may broaden the reach of legal redress for other mothers in a broader pool of plaintiffs. 
 165. See, e.g., Walsh v. Nat’l Computer Sys., Inc., 332 F.3d 1150, 1154–55 (8th Cir. 2003) 
(discussing how a woman supervisor discriminated against a woman worker after the worker returned 
from maternity leave). 
 166. See, e.g., Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998) (holding that 
discrimination consisting of same-sex sexual harassment is actionable under Title VII); Richard F. 
Storrow, Same-Sex Sexual Harassment Claims After Oncale: Defining the Boundaries of Actionable 
Conduct, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 677, 678 (1998). The Supreme Court in Oncale set forth three ways to 
prove same-sex sexual harassment. First, a claimant may demonstrate that the “the harrasser is 
homosexual (and thus presumably motivated by sexual desire).” Oncale, 523 U.S. at 79. In Dick v. 
Phone Directories Co., the Tenth Circuit even found that a plaintiff could establish same-sex sexual 
harassment using this first method based on sexual desire even if the harasser was not a homosexual. 
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against and sexually harass other men.167 The Supreme Court has 
acknowledged that “statutory prohibitions often go beyond the principal 
evil to cover reasonably comparable evils, and it is ultimately the provisions 
of our laws rather than the principal concerns of our legislators by which we 
are governed.”168 If this is the case, then why not accept that a same-sex 
comparator class is appropriate, particularly where the class at issue is 
actually a protected class under Title VII? 
CONCLUSION 
 Recognizing the limitations of Title VII jurisprudence and sex-plus 
discrimination and reevaluating how both can become relevant tools in 
battling workplace discrimination against mothers is critical to the 
continued evolution of gender equality in the workplace. As long as 
negative stereotypes about mothers remain, it is imperative that steps be 
taken to address those stereotypes to the extent that they impact a mother’s 
ability to work. Developing more sophisticated legal tests to address more 
subtle discrimination is necessary to continue to enforce the underlying 
purposes of Title VII. 
                                                                                                                                             
The court acknowledged the “possibility that an alleged harasser may consider herself ‘heterosexual’ but 
nonetheless propose or desire sexual activity with another woman in a harassing manner.” 397 F.3d 
1256, 1265 (10th Cir. 2005). The court looked beyond strict categorization and focused on the 
underlying behavior that connected with the statute—harassment based on sexual desire—rather than 
simply whether someone was of a certain sexual orientation. With the second method, a claimant must 
demonstrate that the harassing behavior shows a general hostility to members of the same sex in the 
workplace. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80. Finally, a claimant may demonstrate that there is “direct comparative 
evidence about how the alleged harasser treated members of both sexes in a mixed-sex workplace.” Id. 
at 80–81. 
 167. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80–81; Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., 305 F.3d 1061, 1068 (9th Cir. 
2002) (finding that the holding in Oncale not only permits claims for same-sex sexual harassment but 
that such conduct is actionable regardless of the victim’s real or perceived sexual orientation). 
 168. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 79. 
